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The Dynamics of Framing and Transactional spaces: The co-creation 
of worth, calculative devices and calculative agencies in the Danish 
wind power market 
 
 
Introduction 
Wind power generated electricity offers a unique vantage point on the nature of markets and the 
specific organizing processes by which markets become constructed, configured, and contested. 
Modern Wind power generated electricity emerged in Denmark after the first oil supply crisis in 
1974 when various entrepreneurial actors responded to that situation and saw wind power as one 
possible solution to ‘the’ problem. Today wind power is globally the fastest growing energy 
technology and supplies significant amounts of energy in countries like Denmark and Germany, in 
Denmark wind power generated electricity supplies 20% of annual electricity consumption. 
Although the trajectory of wind power institutionally and materially is much more robust today than 
25 years ago very few thought that this technology had such a future. In the context of the 1970s 
with modernization and emerging nuclear power, many evaluated wind power as a relic from the 
past, some imagined opportunities (doomed as unrealistic), but nobody imagined that wind power 
should become one of the important ‘weapons’ against the CO2-related climate change at the turn of 
the century. However, confronted with emergent technologies outside the existing evaluative frames 
and institutionalised categories, it is not about being right or wrong from an objective epistemology, 
but about what epistemologies are used to frame the potential worth of a potential new energy 
technology. 
In fact wind power shared a lot with Edison. Like Edison’s electricity system some 100 years earlier, 
the wind power electricity emerged outside the traditional energy sector’s network of techno-
economic and institutional arrangements (innovations meets institutions). Like Edison’s electricity 
system, wind power electricity was ‘misfit’, and its existence as a market technology depended upon 
the ability to create its own new network of techno-economic and institutional arrangements or to 
find ways to ‘break into’, become linked to and transforming the existing network. Either way, the 
market for wind power electricity was not pre-existing, and did not emerge from some mysterious 
process. On the contrary, the transactional space facilitating market exchange of wind power 
electricity was constructed by work and investments that involved multiple actors who mobilized 
actor-worlds, designed artifacts, technical devices, metrologies and legitimate claims, that jointly 
created a calculative frame inscribed in new and changed existing institutional arrangements (rules 
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for exchange/control/property rights). This process entailed institutional entrepreneurship and path 
creation dynamics in order for new calculative agencies as buyers and sellers of wind power to 
emerge (see Figure 1, 2 and 3). 
Like Edisons ‘networks of power’, wind power has since 1975 ‘rolled out into’ many markets such 
as Germany, Spain, China, India and is the worlds fastest growing energy technology. However, this  
path of development or diffusion is not ‘natural’, but intimately linked to the establishment of 
transactional spaces and calculative frame based on national techno-economic and institutional 
arrangements, as well as the ratification of the Kyoto-protocol. However, this paper only analyses 
the making of a market for wind power electricity in Denmark from 1974-1999. 
 
Theoretically this paper proposes the idea that markets are emergent outcomes of organizing 
processes where transactional spaces and calculative/economic agencies become configured and 
temporarily stabilize. The outcomes are neither efficient, neutral nor natural, but constitutes a 
techno-economic and political order, that favours certain groups of firms and actors, also labelled 
entry barriers. The framing of calculative agencies is never linked to the agencies themselves, as 
their capacity to frame depends upon actors being equipped with calculative devices, as well as 
rights, reponsabilities, the construction of (worth) dimensions of merit of the technology, knowledge 
claims on ‘nature’ such as wind regimes, as well as ‘will the material artifact ‘work’ according to 
certain standards, etc. that become articulated within the frame. This links the capacity to frame to an 
extended network of associations and includes ‘research, testing and science’ and legislative 
artefacts, accepted classifications – that are inseparable from ‘political’ coalitions which may 
comprise of politicians, industrial organizations, media, professional, grassroots/civic society etc.. 
 
The conception of the market in theories of technology evolution 
Various new theories on the evolution of technologies such an technology management literature, 
evolutionary economics, social construction of technological systems, and actor-network theory have 
also strived to understand how to conceptualise the market – or better the selection process. One 
strand of research assumes that the market value some functionalistic techno-economic parameters 
(Utterback 1996). Contrary to this view, this paper argues that competition among technologies does 
not happen on the basis of ‘natural-functional-price-performance-characteristics’ and ‘pure market 
forces’ (Hargadorn et xx 2001). Another strand focus on the role of users in shaping rate and 
direction of technical change (von Hippel 1982, Rosenberg 1982, Bijker and Pinch 1987), and yet 
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another strand sees technology evolution as a co-evolution of institutions and technological artifact 
(Dosi 1982, Nelson & Winter 1982, Tushman & Rosenkopf 1992, Nelson 1994?). However, within 
the co-evolutionary view an important dividing line between perspectives relates to the relevance of 
making a distinction between social dynamics versus technological factors involved in making the 
selection, as well as how these valuation processes are conceptualised. The literature on 
constructivist sociology (Callon 1986, Bijker 1987, Latour 1987, Garud & Rappa 1994, McKenzie 
1995, Kreiner & Tryggestad 1997) argues that the distinction is impossible and that the social and 
technical are mutually shaped through socio-technical mediations. This paper builds upon the 
constructivist and institutional sociology in understanding how the historicity and spacing of any 
technology is linked to the commodification of its output, i.e. how reference is made to a potential 
market as well as how it ends up being involved in economic exchange. As McKenzie (1995) states 
“the winner is the one that gets chosen”, but this still leave us with the problem of explaining how 
the ‘market’ choses. Just as Schumpeter states that the term ‘entrepreneur’ (creator personality’ only 
provides a name, a possible locality, but not an explanation of the emergence of novelty 
(Schumpeter, recently discovered never published article ‘Development’ from 1932:p7, 
www.schumpeter.info). 
 
 
Theoretical perspectives on markets as transactional spaces 
Within the economics discipline there are great controvercies about how to think about the market 
(Swedberg 1994). Opposing the neoclassical view of the market has been a dominant trajectory 
within economics, i.e. Austrian and evolutionary economics, as well as economic sociology 
(Swedberg 1994). White (1981) and Baker (1984) showed that the neoclassical tenets about social 
independency among economic actors was a condition for a market did not hold, as signalling and 
knowing the others influenced prices. However, already in 1936 Coase asked, if markets made so 
fantastic effects, why do firms exist? There must be some advantage to keep to transactions within 
the firm rather than using the market mechanism. His answer was that transactions costs matters, and 
that institutions facilitating exchange matters. Thus, following Fligstein (1996) and Coase (1988) 
institutional economics and economic sociology should not only be preoccupied with an argument 
against neoclassical assumptions, but rather engage in empirical research into how markets as 
institutions facilitating exchange come into being.1   
                                                 
1 Coase critized in 1988 general economics for not taking all the institutional conditions for exchange serious 
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In a broad sense this paper builds upon different insights from three institutional theorists that differ 
on some dimensions, but also share some important insights about how we should understand 
markets. The theorists are Coase (1988), Fligstein (1996) and Callon (1998, 1999) and despite some 
differences they share some insights that can be mobilized to advance a sociological and institutional 
understanding of markets.  
They share that 1) markets are institutions, and 2) the term ‘market’ refers to situations where 
‘certain commodified things’ are exchanged between a buyer and a seller for some money (or other 
generalized medium). They all point out that it takes an intricate set of ‘rules’, ‘laws’, ‘machinery’, 
‘classifications’, ‘metrologies and calculative devices’ to enable such economic exchange. In this 
regard there are important differences concerning how these come into being, i.e. the specific work 
and investments and the specific nature of their performance.  
Thus, they differ in the way they conceptualise the processes by which these conditions are 
organized and negotiated. Coase does not conceptually open to the black box of getting the 
institutions organized and transformed, while it is key for Fligstein and Callon, who see the 
institutions of markets as outcomes of contested negotiation processes. To both Fligstein and Callon 
agency processes and entrepreneurship are important in relation to making and breaking 
institutionalized arrangements, but their notion of agency and entrepreneurship is very different as 
Fligstein has a quite mainstream notion of the actor as a human being, whereas Callon would see 
                                                                                                                                                                  
….”when economist speak of market structure it has nothing to do with the market as an institution 
but refers to such things as the number of firms, product differentiation, and the like, the influence of 
the social institutions which facilitate exchange being completely ignored.” (Coase 1988:8) 
Coase continues by emphasizing that institutions are more important in the modern economy  
“I refer to commodity exchanges and stock exchanges. These are normally organized by groups of 
traders (the members of the exchange) which owns (or rents) the physical facility within which 
transactions take place. All exchanges regulate in great detail the activities of those who trade in these 
markets (the times at which transactions can be made, what can be traded, the responsibilities of the 
parties, the terms of settlement, etc.), and they all provide machinery for the settlement of disputes 
and impose sanctions against those who infringe the rules of the exchange (my insert,this is to deal 
with overflows, PK).  
It is not without significance that these exchanges, often used by economist as examples of a perfect 
market and perfect competition, are markets in which transactions are highly regulated (and this quite 
apart from any government regulation that there may be). It suggests, I think correctly, that for 
anything approaching perfect competition to exist, an intricate system of rules and regulations would 
normally be needed. 
Economists observing the regulations of the exchanges often assume that they represent an attempt to 
exercise monopoly power and aim to restrain competition. They ignore or, at any rate, fail to 
emphasize an alternative explanation for these regulations: that they exist in order to reduce 
transaction costs and therefore to increase the volume of trade.” (Coase 1988: p. 8-9) 
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agency as emergent and distributed through the intermediaries that makes a network, and not only 
humans may be actors with agency properties – even though non-humans do not have intentions, 
they may still be ‘author’ of consequences (Callon 1991). Following this, Fligstein and Callon 
differs on role of materials, instruments, texts and work and investments that goes into making 
actors, actor worlds, settle conflicts and achieve legitimacy and meaning. Further, Fligstein seems 
more ‘abstract’ in his approach to ‘markets as politics’, and does not depart in the question as to how 
a specific exchange becomes. In this regard the strength in Callon’s approach is that it does not take 
the seller, the buyer nor calculative behaviour for given. Indeed, with ‘calculative agency’ as the key 
term Callon departs in the exchanging entities, homo economicus, and is preoccupied with how these 
specific entitities emerges as outcome of a framing and equipping process, that include an intricate 
set of operations and investment in ‘rules’, ‘laws’, ‘machinery’, ‘metrologies and calculative 
devices’ to enable the framing and such economic exchange. This perspective build among others on 
the tradition of sociology of accounting which demonstrates that profits cannot be measured without 
and accounting standard or metric, and that these standards and practices emerge and change in 
controvercial processes (Miller 1998). 
 Concerning empirical studies, there are not many using this perspective ……. 
(McKenzie (1995) use the term etno-accountancy to call for more studies into this phenomena, never 
studies are Beuenza & Garud 2003, Tryggestad and Skærbæk 2004, Beuenza & Stark 2004, 
Menuenza & Callon 2002,…..) 
 
 
The Dynamics of Framing and Transactional spaces 
Callon mobilizes Goffmans concept of frame to understand how economic actors such as seller, 
buyer, or regulator organize their identities and world views regarding the worth of an exchange 
(Callon 1998). The framed economic exchange involves an acceptance of possible states of the 
world or properties of a given commodity, relative to certain effects/outcomes of entering an 
exchange or not. Thus, the framing of a market exchange may entail the negotiation of a contract in 
which the actors sort out the conditions and terms of the trade, or it can be the implicit contract 
between a customer with preferences framed according to a product like Coca Cola, organic milk or 
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specific German car brands2. However, as Coase mentioned not anything can be traded, in fact what 
can be traded depends upon certain institutions. 
All exchanges regulate in great detail the activities of those who trade in these markets (the times at which 
transactions can be made, what can be traded, the responsibilities of the parties, the terms of settlement, etc.), 
and they all provide machinery for the settlement of disputes and impose sanctions against those who infringe 
the rules of the exchange (my insert,this is to deal with overflows, PK). Coase 1988:8)  
 
Thus, the capacities to ‘sell’ and ‘buy’ are not intrinsic properties of humans, and homo economicus 
is not a natural entitity, but a rather cultivated entitity. Therefore we build upon Callons (1998) idea 
that calculative agencies emerges and are mediated through socio-technical devices, tools and 
inscribed in institutional arrangements. (Granovetterian social embeddedness) – configuring 
ontologies). 
 To ‘sell’ and ‘buy’ mostly requires that a lot of premises are sorted out outside the narrow context 
of the exchange, such as property rights, classifications of chemicals and threshold values, labour 
work hours, if global warming is considered an externality problem or not, who has rights to use the 
electrical grid to transport electricity etc.. If these are not settled then the involved actors have to 
invest resources and work to produce these clarifications and premises in order to constitute a 
transactional space. Overflowing is defined as the articulation and problematization of issues in 
relation to the outcomes that was not framed at the outset (Callon 1998ab). It can be simply that the 
milk was sour or expiration date passed, or it can be more complex that the car is a ‘Monday-car’ 
with recurring failures that never show when the car is in the garage, or the more well-known  
overflow when air pollution is made a non-desired side-effect of producing and consuming a 
product. The framing/overflowing problematic is not only related to new innovations, but is related 
to the whole career of the commodity where properties can be problematized (Apparadui 1986).  
Departing in Coase’s observations that institutions are important for (any) transactions 
this paper proposes to open the black boxes of ‘making and performing institutions of market 
exchange’. We suggest that the making of transactional spaces for any commodity is seen as a 
hybrid enterprise. Moreover, we see market transactions as emergent outcomes, and emphasizes how 
framing processes are discoursively mobilized and become inscribed – and instituted - in material 
                                                 
2 Preferences are not intrinsic but interactive emergent and mediated in socio-technical processes through interacting 
with other people and/or interacting with a car you test-drive, a Coke bottle or a red Coke sign, the yellow ‘M’ in 
Mcdonald sign, the ‘organic milk symbol on a bottle of milk’ which signals to me that the higher price is justified. In 
that way the whole material arrangement of good in supermarkets and retail to ‘stimulate preferences’ and weaken the 
resistence becomes in focus (Callon & Munieza 2002)  
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objects, laws, framing devices, local norms, legitimate resources, ideologies, identities and 
properties of actors.3 This view confers to but extends Coase’s notion of the ‘machinery’. 
Callon mobilizes Goffmans concept of frame to understand how economic actors such 
as producers, sellers, buyers, or regulators organize their world views/understandings of the worth of 
the exchange (Callon 1998). A major point is that in Goffmans theatre the action within is not ‘only 
social interaction’, but is inscribed in and mediated by the physical structure of the building, the 
material arrangements of the scenes, signs etc.. Similarly, framing denotes and is founded on more 
materialized bases than generic rules for action than in ‘social’ sociology and much institutional 
theory.    
 From this perspective a transactional space comprises its own networked ‘territory’ of 
actor-types (identities, actor-worlds, rights, responsibilities), commodified things, calculative 
devices, legitimate claims, metrologies and valuation processes, materializations (switching costs, 
money income), and circulating materials. Due to the mixed materials in the heterogeneous 
assemblage, it may be seen as a ‘networked territory’, an almost physically ‘conquered space’, with 
a ‘robustness’ that is not easily opened or broken by new entrants, as they have to break the 
materials, problematize, dissolve or redefine the connections (associations) inherent in making the 
existing regime of worth. (The monopolists situation is one typical extreme form of calculative 
agency as well as the idea of perfect competition). 
We may conceive of a stabilized transactional space for certain commodified goods as 
a temporary end result of framing processes, where many contributing elements have been 
institutionalised as black boxed, invisualized or inscribed in legislative artefacts and legitimate 
claims. Thereby stability and predictability in any ‘transactional space’ is not a natural property of a 
‘market’, but a product of the stability of the embedding dimensions of the net-worked arrangement. 
From this conception market change may be conceptualized as ‘openings’ (controversies) in some of 
the embedding dimensions of the stabilized transactional space. Stabilization in a transactional space 
is not based on shared cognition, shared meaning or interests as the key uniting force (as in Garud & 
Rappa 1994, Powell & DiMaggio 1991??): But rather the stability is based on the translation 
processes in which enough shared space (interessements) may be created to enrol and align different 
actors in a network (Callon 1991, similar to Weick 1979, March 1994 – that shared goals not pre-
condition for organizations to exist).. 
                                                 
3 My own abbreviation of this into the ‘4M’s – Meanings, Materials, Money and (Wo)-Men – who become associated 
in networks that create technologies as well as markets. (Karnøe 2000, ATV-report) 
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Transactional spaces are never neutral, their emergent ordering reflects controvercial 
processes, and inevitably “They favour certain groups of firms.” (Fligstein 1996:660). This view 
differs from the form of path dependency arguments where path dependency is seen as a deteriorated 
form of market because the context of the argument is an idea of a free market with open choices 
(David 1984, David et xx 1988). 
From a transactional spaces perspective path dependencies and possible lock-in are 
outcomes of processes where actors through progressive decisions become more and more trapped in 
networks of their own making, from which they may neither have the desire nor resources to escape 
(Callon 1998:48). It must also be remembered that such institutionalised lock-ins where the ‘past 
becomes constituted in the future’ can be seen as both assets and liabilities for existing technologies 
(Kreiner 199x) for new coming technologies. Therefore an interest in path creation processes are 
important to understand the dynamics of transformation and change in networks (Garud & Karnøe 
2001, 2003). Path creation refers to processes of deviations from existing orders, and specifically the 
entrepreneurial processes whereby human agencies set in motion processes whereby intermediaries 
are mobilized and become associated to constitute new visions of possible states of the world, as 
well as new socio-technical networks. 
We see the organizing of these institutional arrangements as an ongoing process of 
mediation where all sorts of framing devices are mobilized and inscribed by humans – and in turn 
supplies humans with the material for our construction and re-construction of that networked world. 
The specific proposition of this paper is the constitution of transactional spaces and 
therefore a market is ongoing and is not a ‘once and for all’ institutional closure.  On the contrary, 
based on the wind turbine study, it is argued that so-called continuity in the transactional space for 
wind power electricity depends upon the transformation, substitution and re-engineering of 
properties of the calculative agencies, calculative devices, the associated world states, and the 
justifications used to knit the different elements of the calculative frame together. We will mobilize 
Thevenot et al (2003) notion of justifications as an important device to knitting and weaving 
(‘gluing’) together coalitions over time. It is argued here that multiple or bundles of justifications at 
any point in time enhances coalition building as bundles (more than one) of justifications helps to 
build ‘shared spaces’ among diverse actors (or networks of longer and more diverse materials, 
Latour 1987), but not necessary shared meanings or interests. Shared meanings and interests may be 
a resulting outcome from engaging in the organizing process of a transactional space, but it not to be 
seen as a premise for beginning the interaction. The many weak ties and associations may generate 
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surprising robustness, until more permanent irreverbilisation. It is argued here that this dynamics 
contributes to the robustness of a regime of worth for any technology, here wind power. Further, 
over time justifications may shift and be subject to substitutions in contend and ranking. This 
coalition building is indeed heterogeneous engineering, in involves ongoing translations to bring so 
many different entities together that constitutes a calculative framing. 
 Transactional spaces and the involved elements of a calculative frame only exist in 
action, therefore the arrangement and the associated worth of a product like wind power electricity is 
always emergent and dynamic. It is in the very process of consummating or performing the elements 
of the frame, that unexpected overflows to the frame may be identified and articulated. This may 
problematize existing properties of elements and their associations, and dealing with them may 
require a re-working and re-negotiation of the elements and associations that constitutes a calculative 
frame in a transactional space (micro-level agencies and their translation of these 
elements/entities/devices in their local framing process). Complete framing is impossible and 
overflowing is the norm as Callon states. Critical moments are to be expected as with Mad cows 
disease, nuclear power accidents, when  ‘something does not go the way it used to or was expected 
to’, and becomes problematized. Bolthansky & Thevenot   
 
  
 
Analytical dimensions of the paper – configuring calculative agencies, 
calculative devices and making wind power part of value chains–   
Specifically the paper will illustrate the gradual and contested character of the institutionalisation 
processes associated with making a market for Danish wind power from 1974-1999. Empirically the 
analysis shows how calculative agencies are co-created with calculative devices, rights and 
responsibilities, as criteria for evaluating the worth of wind power electricity + justifications for 
aligning the coalition of actors….. 
See below how existing value chain of electricity production are configured (fig. 1 and 3), and see in 
figure 2 2 options for how wind power could become linked into electricity chain – either by 
connection A or connection B. 
As figure 3 shows there are several markets in this value chain and this empirical analysis only 
studies M 2 and M 1a. 
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Figure 1: The Danish electricity system before wind power was introduced: Utility Power Plant, 
electric Grid, Transformers, and end users. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: How to invest in a wind turbine and get value or worth out of the power it produces? 
Strategy A – selling to utilities or B – own consumption of the electricity? 
How to connect a 
wind turbine? 
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Ne
 
 
 A 
 
or
  
B 
gure 3: Value chain with emerging calculative agencies for wind power in market ‘M2’ 
 
w value chain and calcu
aM 1
lative agencies                            Existing value chain without wind power                   
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 The emergent wind power market in figure 2 and 3 is an outcome of a highly specific and contingent 
processes of configuration of calculative agencies that did not pre-exist (figure 1), but were co-
produced with various devices for calculative framing. Indeed it was not an ‘efficient linear process’, 
but a path contingency process where institutional and legal rights were disrupted, re-negotiated such 
that the path at any point could move in different directions. 
As ‘the making process unfolds’ the outcomes of the interactive constellations of the 
framing and the framing devices such as tools, justifications and classifications are not mechanical 
or predictable. Thus, the disciplining role of tools and devices in formatting calculative agencies and 
markets is not deterministicly given. In Callons words: 
 “It [the Foucaudian disciplining, pk] evolves and transforms 
itself since the tools, those solid points in the system, are themselves plastic, 
open, reconfigurable, and, moreover, constantly reconfigured. As framing 
and calculating tools they have the property, through transforming 
themselves, of varying the modalities of framing and calculation. They are 
exchangers which stabilize certain procedures but simultanously help them 
to evolve. (Callon 1998a:26) 
 
There is loose or emergent coupling as the interaction unfolds (Weick 1979), and tools 
makes agencies in an unfolding ordering characterized by dynamics of affordances and resistences 
(Pickering 1995, Hutchby?, 2003), and where the interests and identities of involved 
actants/agencies may change in the process of putting them in play, as ‘consequences/overflows’ are 
articulated and ‘states of world’ problematized (Callon 1998, March 1994).  
 
The main analytical dimensions of the paper will be: 
1. The emergence of calculative agencies. An important part of actor-making processes are 
also the emergence of economic actors as ‘calculative agencies’. Indeed from this 
perspective actors do not have intrinsic or pre-given capacities, but are emergent properties 
and variable geometry that are contingent upon the socio-technical networks in which they 
are embedded (Callon 1998/1999, Granovetter 19xx) or ontologies (Hodgson).  The specific 
identities/roles, rights and responsibilities, capacities to act, competencies, preferences and 
interest of ‘producers’/’suppliers’, ‘users’/’buyers’, ‘scientists’, ‘media’ and ‘regulators’, 
may be dynamic and changing. 
2. Calculative devices and how their formation framed the worth of wind power first in private 
and local negotiations, and later how the worth of wind power depend upon how 
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‘investment subsidies’ and ‘income subsidies’ for wind power became inscribed in 
legislative artefacts (and supported and justified by a political coalition). The value of an 
idea/thing/product is not laying ‘in a product’ by nature, and we study how wind power over 
time is given different values which depends upon recognizable properties (value-metrics, 
dimensions of merit/non-merit), and how these dimensions becomes legitimate and 
acceptable. Such issues as externality costs/benefits arising from wind power or 
conventional energy production become important here and key in the formation of 
parameters and their value in a calculative device.4 Formatting calculative devices is about 
settling on ‘brackets’ – what is inside and what is outside. What counts – and how to count 
what counts as sociology of accounting formulates it (Miller 1998). Calculative devices 
performs the economy when they are organized, like accounting tools (Beuenza & Garud 
2003). Calculative devices do not give deterministic effects, their effects emerge by being 
translated and enacted – indeed for every single buyer of a wind turbine an understanding or 
norm for acceptable Return on Investment shapes if they buy a wind turbine or not, if the 
exchange is accomplished or not. Some of the earliest buyers were highly ideologically 
motivated ‘for alternative energy and against centralism and nuclear power’, and 
consequently accepted a very low ROI – just enough to avoid losses or enough profit to buy 
some ‘red wine’ for the annual meeting in the wind turbine cooperative. Later this user type 
was marginalized to those demanding more and more ROI. 
3. Wind power and the material standards of Direct Current and quality of electric current so as 
to serve fine electronics. This relates to the commodification process by which we mean the 
ways in which an idea, a thing, a product feature becomes recognized as suitable for market 
transactions. Clearly, electricity is not just atoms as pure nature, but socialized atoms packed 
in certain ways to have certain qualities in socio-technical networks.  
4. Transactional spaces as Networked territories that are made possible as multiple actors share 
elements/embedding dimensions of the transactional spaces, but this is not the same as all 
actors in the coalition’ have shared interests, shared meaning nor share the same goal – but 
still the may participate in the coalition.  This is important in the ongoing process on knitting 
                                                 
4 The economic discipline does recognize externalities, but does not conceptualise the process by which issues are 
articulated, nor how they become transformed/translated into a parameter with a certain value used in calculations. That 
is they do not conceptualise how the institutions as well as specific parameters that enter the ‘calculative device’ 
become mobilized and organized. Constructivist sociology offers a perspective on this that goes beyond ‘classic 
realism’, drops the ‘social’ of ‘social constructivism’ and make claim for hyper-realism as a form of constructivism 
(Latour 1999, 2003). 
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and weaving together elements comprising the transactional space. We will mobilize 
Thevenot et al (2003) notion of justifications as an important device to knitting and weaving 
(‘gluing’) together coalitions over time. It is argued here that multiple justifications at an 
point in time enhances coalition building as justifications helps to build ‘shared spaces’ (or 
networks of longer and more diverse materials, Latour 1987), but not necessary shared 
meanings or interests. Further, over time justifications may shift and be subject to 
substitutions in contend and ranking. It is argued here that this dynamics contributes to the 
robustness of a regime of worth for any technology, here wind power. 
 
Table 1 is an attempt to illustrate the ‘gradual filling out’ as well as change in the institutional 
arrangement and the calculative device. Changing agencies, legislative artefacts, classifications, 
calculative devices, justifications – coalitions of actors (maybe worldviews) 
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Table 1: Framing dynamics in the Danish wind power market: Constructing calculative agents, 
calculative devices and justifications. 
subject Pre- 1975 1975 1976 1979 1983/84 1985/86 
Wind turbine 
owner framing 
rigths 
 
Individuals and 
Cooperatives 
with shared 
ownership 
Not existing 
entity  
no rights 
1) Riisager 
negotiate with  
Local Utility 
 
2) Møller 
negotiate with  
Local utility 
3 km restriction 
on distance 
between 
owners house 
and wind 
turbine site. 
Linked to local 
utility 
3 km restriction 
and linked to 
local utility 
No restrictions 
on distance 
between 
owners house 
and the wind 
turbine site 
Residence 
criteria: 
Max 10 km 
Power prod. 
Only 35% 
more than own 
consumption 
Elements in 
Calculative 
device: 
 
1)  Utility 
payment for 
wind power 
Utilities not 
involved in 
wind power 
Local 
contracts: 
1)Kwh-
exchange 
2) Money 9-øre
National 
Guidelines 
(DEF) for 
contracts: 
Payment  
Equivalent to 
fuel savings 
  New Natio-nal 
Guide-lines 
(DEF) 
10 years 
70% of nor-mal 
el-price 
 
2) Grid 
connection 
costs 
  Utility paid and 
reponsable 
for everything 
Utility paid and 
reponsable 
for everything 
Shift from 
shared payment 
to 3 shared 
(state, utility, 
owner) 
 
3) State invest. 
Subsidy to 
wind turbine 
owner 
   30 % of retail 
value of wind 
turbine 
25% to 
individual 
 
 
 
25% extra for 
wind farms 
20% (dropping 
to 10% 1988- 
stopped in 
1989 
wind farm 
stopped 
4) State – 
income subsidy 
to wind turbine 
owner 
    Refund of 
electricity tax 
20 øre/2-3 euro 
cents 
 
Accepted  
Return on 
Investment for 
wind turbine 
owners 
 Modest profit- 
Avoid losses 
 ‘enough profit 
to buy red 
wine’ for 
annual meeting 
  Wind turbine 
owner types 
with different 
profiles for 
Return On 
Investment  
 
Electricity 
quality 
(standard) 
 Must be met Must be met Must be met  Must be met  
 Pre-1975 1975 1976 1979 1983/84 1985/86 
 
Another important framing devices was the development of the ‘Wind Atlas’, that was used to 
‘represent and clarify’ the wind properties of Nature and estimate the economic value of the wind 
regime in a certain geographical location based on the ruggedness of the landscape and wind speed 
characteristics. 
 
Also the approval system, that only allowed state subsidies to approved wind turbines was 
important, as the important criteria of the approval scheme was to ensure that the ‘operational 
reliability of the wind turbine’ (safety brake systems) as well as levels of fatique in used materials 
as the wind turbine was exposed to severe structural tensions and vibrations in its life time. 
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